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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BENEFICIARY'S CODE REMEDY AGAINST CONVERTING
TRUSTEE AND BANKRUPTCY POLICY
The recently enacted Indiana Trust Code' is primarily a reorganiza-
tion and restatement of Indiana's trust law. Pre-Code law was, in
certain areas, either modernized or supplemented.' Sections 22(b) and
(c) of chapter 3 of the Code' deal with a beneficiary's remedies against
a trustee who has converted trust property." These sections may
adversely affect defrauded beneficiaries since, under certain circumstances,
these claimants may recover less than under pre-Code law.
PRE-CODE LAW
Pre-Code determination of a beneficiary's remedies against a breach-
ing trustee required judicial consideration of two questions: (1) Under
what circumstances might a beneficiary's claim against his trustee's
assets take precedence over those of other claimants? (2) When these
circumstances are met, how is the beneficiary to be indemnified?
1. Pub. L. No. 416, [1971] Ind. Acts 1910; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1301 et seq.
(Supp. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as Code].
2. REPORT OF INDIANA TRUST CODE STUDY COMMtaIsSION iii (1970) [hereinafter
cited as REPORT]. See Ard, A Proposed Trust Code for Indiana--Alt Effort at Reform,
45 NoTm DAmm LAW. 427, 428 (1970). The Trust Code Study Commission's com-
ments form the legislative history. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 1, § 7, [1971] Ind. Acts 1913;
INDm. ANN. STAT. § 31-1307 (Supp. 1971).
3. (b) If the trustee acquires property and wrongfully holds it outside the
trust, a beneficiary is entitled at his option to either:
(1) require the property to be transferred to the trust or
(2) impose an equitable lien upon it to secure his claim for damages
for breach of trust.
(c) If the trustee commingles the trust funds or property with his own
funds or property or converts the trust fund or property into another form
which is wrongfully held outside the trust:
(1) if the fund or property can be traced and identified, the beneficiary is
entitled to restoration of the fund or property to the trust; or
(2) if the fund or property cannot be traced and identified,
(A) In a case of commingling of funds or property, the beneficiary
is entitled to a lien against the trustee's individual property from the date
and in the amount of the fund or the value of the property at the time of the
commingling.
(B) In a case of conversion of property, the beneficiary is entitled to a
lien against the trustee's individual property from the date and according to
the value of the property at the time of the conversion.
Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, §§ 22(b), (c), [1971] Ind. Acts 1931; IND. ANN. STAT.
§§ 31-1522(b), (c) (Supp. 1971). Unless otherwise indicated, all sections mentioned
in footnotes or text will be from ch. 3 of the Code.
4. While subsection (b) does not mention conversion, and subsection (c) speaks
of conversion and commingling as independent wrongs, it is correct terminology to
define any wrongful taking of property as "conversion." See BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY
402 (4th ed. 1968).
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A beneficiary's priority may be established in three ways.5 First,
priority may be based on the initial augmentation of the trustee's personal
assets. Under this theory the beneficiary must show that the trustee
has wrongfully withdrawn assets from the trust estate.6 Once the initial
augmentation is shown, the beneficiary is able to obtain a general
priority over the trustee's assets ahead of all other claimants.' A second
possible avenue of recovery requires a showing that the trustee's estate
has been ultimately augmented by the value of the converted assets. This
method, known as the swollen assets theory,' permits recovery if the
beneficiary can demonstrate that the trust res9 has either remained
in the trustee's possession or has been used to pay a debt which the
trustee would otherwise have paid with his own assets." Finally, a
beneficiary's recovery may be based on tracing. This test requires the
beneficiary "to trace his property into a product in the hands of the
wrongdoer at the time when he seeks to enforce his claim.""
The tests require varying degrees of proof. Under the initial aug-
mentation test the beneficiary will obtain priority whenever he can prove
that his trustee misappropriated trust assets. The swollen assets theory
is more stringent since it requires proof that the trustee used trust assets
in a certain, limited manner. The greatest burden is placed on the
beneficiary who must trace and prove that his misappropriated asset
remains in the trustee's possession.
While an early Indiana case appeared to favor the swollen assets
5. A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 521 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as
SCOTT]. Prof. Scott actually lists four methods. The initial augmentation of the trustee's
estate is regarded as a separate basis for recovery, distinguished from a trustee's
immediate dissipation of the trust funds. The three methods explained in text are
similar to those listed in 8 IND. L.J. 571, 572-73 (1933).
6. SCOTT, spra note 5, § 521, at 3647-48.
7. All three situations provide the beneficiary with priority should he meet
the requisite standards of proof. This would give him priority over any lien or judg-
ment creditor who also has an interest in the assets. While this priority must be kept
in mind throughout this discussion, the question of the "secret lien" aspects involved
when this priority is granted is not covered in this note.
8. For an extensive treatment in support of this theory see Taft, A Defense of
a Limited Use of The Swollen Assets Theory Where Money has Wrongfully Been Min-
gled with, Other Money, 39 COLUm. L. REv. 172 (1939). See also G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEE § 922 (2d ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as BOGERT].
9. This term refers to either the trust property itself or any subsequent product
of that property.
10. Thus, under this view, if the wrongdoer obtained money by fraud and
used it in paying his debts, the victim would be entitled to priority if the
wrongdoer, had he not obtained the victim's money, would have used his own
money in paying his debts.
ScoTT, supra note 5, § 521, at 3648-49.
11. Id., at 3649.
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theory,'2 subsequent decisions" have adopted the tracing test. Wind-
stanley v. Second National Bank 4 provides the reasoning behind this
choice:
The trust property rightfully belongs to the cestuis que trust
[sic] and a change in its form does not change its ownership.
So long as either the original or substituted property can be
traced or followed, equity will always attribute the ownership
to the beneficiary and will not allow the right to be defeated by
the wrongful act of the fiduciary, no matter what form it may
assume.
35
Conditioning a beneficiary's recovery over other creditors on his ability
to trace assets vitiated any need to argue equities. Since a person was
logically entitled to his own property, proving that certain assets in the
trustee's possession were actually trust property provided adequate justi-
fication for the beneficiary's priority. 6
Prior to the enactment of the Code three remedies were available to
a beneficiary with a valid claim: the tracing remedy,' the lien remedy
and the general damage action. Under the first, a beneficiary able to
show that the trust res was among the trustee's assets could recover the
property itself.' Under the lien remedy a beneficiary satisfying the same
condition could obtain a secured damage claim so that the trustee was
held liable for the value of the misappropriated property. 9 When a
12. State v. Farmers & Merchants Natl Bank, 71 Ind. App. 216, 124 N.E. 501
(1919).
13. See Ross v. Thompson, 128 Ind. App. 89, 146 N.E.2d 259 (1957), and cases
cited therein. McCabe v. Grantham, 108 Ind. App. 695, 31 N.E.2d 658 (1941), granted
recovery under a tracing rationale. Union Sec., Inc. v. Merchants' Trust & Say. Co.,
205 Ind. 127, 186 N.E. 261 (1933), denied recovery for failure to trace.
14. 13 Ind. App. 544, 41 N.E. 956 (1895).
15. Id. at 547, 41 N.E. at 957.
16. This property orientation becomes exceedingly important during the discus-
sion of the beneficiary's rights when the trustee is insolvent. See text accompanying
notes 40-42 infra.
17. This term may be somewhat confusing to the reader since "tracing" has
already been discussed as a basis for priority. The difference between the two uses is this
--when a beneficiary traces his asset, he is simply showing that his asset is present
among those of the trustee; the "tracing remedy" is the term employed to denote the
beneficiary's remedy for obtaining the specific asset traced. See BOGERT, supra note
8, § 565, at 47. Cf. J. DAvsoN & G. PALimR, CASES ON RESTiTUTION 174 (2d ed. 1969).
18. See, e.g., Ross v. Thompson, 128 Ind. App. 89, 146 N.E.2d 259 (1957). Part
of the plaintiff's claim was for bank stock which was allegedly trust proper/y. It is
not clear, however, that the stock was obtained while the trustee was acting in a
fiduciary capacity.
19. Union Sec., Inc. v. Merchants' Trust & Say. Co., 205 Ind. 127, 139, 186
N.E. 261 (1933). Authorities appear to agree on permitting the beneficiary to choose
between the tracing remedy and the lien remedy. See BOGERT, supra note 8, § 865; III
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beneficiary was unable to identify his assets he was relegated to main-
taining an unsecured damage action.2" These remedies were mutually
exclusive. The theoretical difference between the tracing remedy and the
other two damage remedies prevented the beneficiary from relying on
both damages and recovery of the trust res. As Professor Bogert has
noted:
[i]f the beneficiary chooses to rely on money liability plus
this equitable lien on the trust property or its proceeds, he
has obviously made an election inconsistent with tracing the
trust property and claiming it as his equitable property. Under
this lien theory the property is that of the defendant..
Under the tracing plan the plaintiff claims that legal title .
is held by the defendant but that it is equitably owned by the
plaintiff.21
The susceptibility of the res to fluctuation in value requires that a
beneficiary be given the right to choose between the two secured
remedies.22 Limiting him to the tracing method would deprive him of
the difference between the assets' original value and the value of the
recovered res whenever the trust res has depreciated. On the other hand,
denying him use of the tracing method could result in unnecessary and
expensive litigation if the property is worth at least as much as it was
at the time of the breach.
§ 22(c)(1): A POSSIBLE LIMITATION ON BENEFICIARY'S RECOVERY
While the Code retains the pre-Code tracing requirements, the
remedies afforded beneficiaries in § 22 differ from those previously
available. The Code differentiates between the beneficiary whose trust
SCOT, supra note 5, § 202; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 202 (1959) [herein-
after cited as RESTATEiENT].
20. BOGERT, supra note 8, § 868, at 58.
It is fundamental that damages may be assessed in favor of a beneficiary
against a defaulting trustee either to compensate the beneficiary for such
loss as he may have sustained as a result of the breach of trust, or to prevent
the faithless trustee from unjustly enriching himself as a result of his breach
of fiduciary duty.
Standard Mach. Co. v. Duncan Shaw Corp., 208 F.2d 61, 65 (1st Cir. 1953). The
beneficiary naturally prefers to obtain a secured claim whenever possible. Thus, while
the beneficiary may always maintain a damage claim when property has depreciated,
the beneficiary will opt for the lien remedy if the asset can be traced.
21. BOGERT, .supra note 8, § 865, at 46-7 (footnotes omitted). Naturally, this
analysis is equally applicable when there is a desire to obtain unsecured damages and
recovery of the traced asset.
22. Id., § 865, at 47; RESTATEMENT, sitpra note 23, § 202, comment on subsection
(1) (a) at 444; SCOTT, supra note 5, § 516.
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asset has been wrongfully retained by the trustee 3 and the beneficiary
whose trust asset was either commingled or converted. 4 Section 22(b)
is applicable when "the trustee acquires [trust] property and wrong-
fully holds it outside the trust."25 The beneficiary may then either
"require the property to be transferred to the trust" or "impose an
equitable lien upon it to secure his claim for damages for breach of
trust."2 But when a trustee commingles or converts trust assets, §22(c)
(1) limits the beneficiary to recovery of the trust res. There is no
mention of an alternative remedy. Section 22(c) (1), therefore, may
force the beneficiary to bear the risk of depreciation since recovery of
the trust property would preclude any further damage recovery. Indeed,
he will usually bear this risk since a defaulting trustee most often
commingles or converts trust funds.2" Thus, the Code effectively denies
most beneficiaries who choose to recover the trust res use of the lien
remedy.
The only justification for distinguishing § 22(b) from § 22(c) (1)
beneficiaries is that under § 22(c) (1) the trustee has changed the trust
property's identity, whereas under § 22(b) the trust property has been
retained. This seems to be inadequate justification for such differentia-
tion.2
It must be noted that a beneficiary who is denied the lien remedy
23. Pub. L No. 416, ch. 3, § 22(b), [1971] Ind. Acts 1931; IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 31-1522(b) (Supp. 1971).
24. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 22(c) (1), [1971] Ind. Acts 1931; Im). ANN. STAT.
§ 31-1522 (c) (1) (Supp. 1971). Indeed, commingling assets presents a particular problem
for the trustee's beneficiary. The beneficiary, called on to prove that his asset is
among the trustee's assets to which he has traced its product, uses various fictions
which "prove" that it still exists in the commingled fund. See, e.g., Terre Haute
Trust Co. v. Scott, 94 Ind. App. 461, 181 N.E. 369 (1932) (trust money commingled
with the trustee's own cash assets). For a full discussion of these fictions see Scott,
The Right to Follow Money Wrongfully Mingled with Other Money, 27 HAv. L.
REv. 125 (1913).
25. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 22(b), [1971] Ind. Acts 1931; IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 31-1522(b) (Supp. 1971). It is unclear what is meant by "acquires property."
Ostensibly acquisition could occur in two different ways. First, it could occur when
the trust property is simply converted to the trustee's use. It may also occur when the
trustee exercises his trust duties by purchasing new assets and then wrongfully retains
them as his own.
26. These options, it should be noted, are the same ones provided under pre-
Code law.
27. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
28. The only Indiana case which seems to fall under § 22(b) is Ross v. Thompson,
128 Ind. App. 89, 146 N.E.2d 259 (1957), where only part of the claimed trust
assets were in the original trust estate.
29. There is no legislative history of the Code except for the Commission com-
ments. Section 22(c) represents a change from pre-Code law. Unfortunately, the
Commission failed to explain why these changes were made. See REPoRT, mcpra note
2, ch. 3, § 22, comment ().
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under § 22(c)(1) may avoid a depreciation loss by obtaining an
unsecured damage claim for the value of the trust assets at the time of
their conversion. The Code has retained various sections under which
the use of an unsecured damage claim may be a viable remedy. Section
11(b) provides that the trustee is liable for: (1) any depreciation
caused by his breach of trust; (2) any profit made on the breach; and,
(3) any reasonable profit which would have occurred in the absence of a
breach."0 In addition, § 3 preserves Indiana's prudent man rule," while
§§ 6(b) (4) and (5) direct the trustee to preserve the trust and make it
productive. 2 An unsecured damage claim will, however, result in full
recovery only when the trustee is solvent. Unfortunately, Indiana cases
indicate that defaulting trustees are usually insolvent." In these cases
bankruptcy proceedings are inevitably involved. As a result, scores of
claimants clamor for those assets which remain in the trustee's possession.
To provide an equitable order of compensation for these claims, the
Bankruptcy Act34 permits certain claimants priority status." A bene-
ficiary's unsecured damage claim will be satisfied after these priority
claims on a pro rata basis with other general claims. 6 The dividend,
however, is usually quite small. Indeed, it is not unusual for general
claimants to obtain no compensation whatsoever. This unattractive prob-
ability is ameliorated, to some extent, by the fact that claims arising from
30. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 11(b), [1971] Ind. Acts 1926; IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 31-1511(b) (Supp 1971).
31. In acquiring, investing, reinvesting, exchanging, retaining, selling and
managing property for any trust heretofore or hereafter created, the trustee
thereof shall execise the judgment and care under the circumstances then
prevailing which men of prudence . . . exercise in the management of
their own affairs, not in regard to speculation ...
Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 3(c), [1971] Ind. Acts 1921; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1503(c)
(Supp. 1971).
For a pre-Code use of the rule, see Gavin v. Miller, 222 Ind. 459, 54 N.E.2d 277(1944). For a thorough discussion of the origins of this rule and its uses see Shattuck,
The Massachusetts Prudent Man in Trust Investments, 25 B.U.L. Rlv. 307 (1945).32. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, §§ 6(b) (4), (5), [1971] Ind. Acts 1923; IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 31-1506(b) (4), (5) (Supp 1971).
33. See, e.g., Union Trust Co. v. Ralston, 101 Ind. App. 548, 191 N.E. 94 (1934) ;Union Sec., Inc. v. Merchants' Trust & Say. Co., 205 Ind. 127, 186 N.E. 261 (1933) ;
Rottger v. First Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 98 Ind. App. 139, 184 N.E. 267 (1933);
Pearce v. Dill, 149 Ind. 136, 48 N.E. 788 (1897). See also cases cited in I L. WALLACE,
INDIANA ANNOTATIONS TO THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 114-15 (1953).
34. 11 U.S.C. §1 etseq. (1970).
35. Bankruptcy Act, § 64; 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
36. A "general claim" is one which does not qualify as either a "claim entitled
to priority," a "preferred claim" or a "lien claim." It is, thus, a claim which is
entitled to no special treatment. Should the beneficiary find himself in this position
he takes only a pro rata share of whatever assets remain after priority, preferred
and lien claimants take their full claims, to the extent that those claims are secured.
C. NADLER, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY §§ 182-85 (2d ed. M. Nadler & S. Nadler 1969).
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fiduciary breaches survive bankruptcy. 7 In most cases, however, the
beneficiary is not provided a useful remedy. The possibility of future
recovery seldom outweighs the loss of time and money involved in
further proceedings. Furthermore, the beneficiary may not be inclined
to forego recovery of the property's present value under § 22(c)(1).
Thus, the beneficiary is likely to choose § 22(c) (1)'s tracing method
over the less attractive damage remedy.
A literal application of § 22(c) (1) will, therefore, result in denying
the beneficiary complete restitution. While it may be argued that this was
the desired result, the wording of § 11(b) indicates otherwise." It must
be assumed, therefore, that the legislature intended full restitution for
all beneficiaries and that the omission of the lien remedy from § 22(c) (1)
was an oversight.
THE EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY ON A BENEFIcIARY'S LIEN UNDER
§ 22(c) (2)
While § 22(c) (1) withdraws one of the pre-Code remedies,
§ 22(c) (2) appears to afford beneficiaries some additional security.
Under this section a beneficiary's inability to trace trust assets no longer
precludes him from obtaining a secured claim. However, a more thorough
analysis of § 22(c) (2) indicates that this secured status is illusory.
Indiana's pre-Code trust law followed the most widely accepted view
of a beneficiary's right to priority status.
The claim of the beneficiary against the trustee for breach
of trust does not of itself entitle him to priority over the
general creditors of the trustee. . . . The beneficiary is entitled
to priority only if and to the extent that he can trace the
trust property into a product. He must prove not only that the
trustee once had the trust product, but that he still holds the
trust property, or property which is in whole or in part the
product of the trust property. 9
There are two interrelated justifications for this view. The first, based
upon a concept of unjust enrichment, is most succinctly stated in Professor
37. Bankruptcy Act, § 17; 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1970). See SCOTT, supra note 5, § 221.
38. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
39. RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 202, comment on subsection (2) at 454. See
also BOGERT, supra note 8, at 862; SCOTT, supra note 5, §9 202, 521; 4A W. CorIER,
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY f1 70.25 [2) (14th ed. J. Moore & L. King 1969) [hereinafter
cited as COLLImER]; 8 IN. L.J. 571, 572 (1933). The leading pre-Code case following
this principle is Terre Haute Trust Co. v. Scott, 94 Ind. App. 461, 181 N.E. 369 (1932),
in which the plaintiff was permitted to recover the value of the converted assets from the
trust company's funds only when he was able to trace the trust assets to those funds.
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Scott's treatise.4" Scott contends that no beneficiary should be denied
priority status if he is able to trace. He reasons, however, that if the
trust assets cannot be traced, the beneficiary would be unable to dis-
tinguish his claim from those of general creditors. Thus, the beneficiary
is entitled to priority compensation only when these creditors would
otherwise benefit unreasonably from the trustee's misappropriation.
Whenever there is no proof that the other general creditors would be
unjustly enriched, relegating the beneficiary to general creditor status
is justified.
The second justification for affording priority status only to bene-
ficaries able to trace their trust assets is based upon concepts of property
rights and title.4 ' These concepts inextricably underlie Professor Scott's
reasoning. Providing a beneficiary priority over general creditors ef-
fectively establishes the superiority of his rights in those assets traced.
When the beneficiary is unable to trace those assets, however, he has no
superior property rights and thus should not have priority over general
creditors.
A bankruptcy trustee takes title to all property in which
the bankrupt has title . . ., but when it appears that a bankrupt
is only a trustee . . . the court should turn it over to its true
owner where possible . . . [citations omitted].
No creditor of a bankrupt can demand that the estate of
the bankrupt be augmented by the wrongful conversion of the
property of another, or the application to the general estate of
property which never rightfully belonged to the vendor.4"
Notwithstanding this historical and theoretical context, the Indiana
General Assembly chose to grant priority status to any beneficiary falling
under § 22, whether or not he could trace his misapporiated assets.
Section 22(c) (2) establishes the presumption that beneficiaries have
superior property rights in the trustee's assets. However, the Bankruptcy
Act's main purpose is to prevent inequities in the distribution of estates
in bankruptcy. 3 Since this state-created priority gives rise to such an
inequity, this attempt at priority distribuiton will be invalidated by the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.
The Bankruptcy Act invalidates preferences,44 and certain statutory43
40. ScoTT, supra note 5, § 521, at 3649.
41. See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
42. It re Tate-Jones & Co., 85 F. Supp. 971, 981-82 (W.D. Pa. 1949).
43. Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 210 (1945); In re Dearborn Mfg. Corp.,
92 F.2d 417, 418 (6th Cir. 1937). See also 4 COLIjER, supra note 39, II 67.12 [5].
44. Bankruptcy Act, § 60; 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970).
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and judicial liens." Since the lien on traced assets provided under
§ 22(b) falls in none of these categories, it will not be invalidated by the
Bankruptcy Act.4" However, in providing the beneficiary with a priority
when he is unable to trace his trust assets, § 22(c) (2) creates a statutory
lien." Section 67c (1) (B) of the Bankruptcy Act invalidates:
every statutory lien which is not perfected or enforceable at
the date of bankruptcy against one acquiring the rights of a
bona fide purchaser from the debtor on that date. .
Chapter 4, § 2 of the Code makes the beneficiary's claim invalid against
bona fide purchasers." Thus, a beneficiary's lien will be unenforceable
against a bona fide purchaser unless it was obtained prior to the date of
bankruptcy. Since the beneficiary's action for breach of trust will most
often take place after bankruptcy, the lien will usually fail against a
trustee in bankruptcy.
Federal court decisions provide further support for this conclusion.
In John Deere Plow Co. v. McDavid, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a beneficiary was entitled only to those trust assets
which he was able to trace. Since John Deere Co." was decided long
before congressional enactment of § 67c, no federal statutory provision
was available to prevent a beneficiary's priority recovery under a state
statute. Nonetheless, the court held that bankruptcy policies would not
45. Bankruptcy Act, §§ 60, 64, 67; 11 U.S.C. §§ 96, 104, 107 (1970).
46. Bankruptcy Act. § 67; 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1970).
47. 3A CoLuIER, supra note 39, ff 64.02, at 2065.
48. It may be difficult to distinguish the statutory lien created by § 22(c) (2)
from the equitable lien created by § 22(b). The difficulty probably lies in a mis-
apprehension about codification. A statutory lien is a very limited lien whose sole
purpose is as a bankruptcy priority. Property which is traced (as long as tracing
fictions are accepted) does not fall under the Bankruptcy Act at all, for tracing permits
the beneficiary to identify property which should not be in the bankrupt trustee's
possession. However, when tracing is impossible, the beneficiary cannot maintain that
he falls outside the Act since he is in the same position as other general creditors. A
statute which removes a party from his proper class in bankruptcy and places him
in a better position creates a statutory lien.
49. 11 U.S.C. § 107c(1) (B) (1970). See Stageman, Section 67c Primer, 73
Com. LJ. 237, 240 (1968); Comment, Statutory Liens Under Section 67c of the
Bankruptcy Act: Some Problems of Definition, 43 Tut. L. Rxv. 305 (1969).
50. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 4, § 2(b), [1971] Ind. Acts 1935; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1602(b) (Supp. 1971).
51. 137 F. 802 (8th Cir. 1905).
52. The statute was not enacted in its present form until 1966. Act of July 5,
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-495, §§ .3, 4, 80 Stat. 268, amending 11 U.,.C. § 67 (1964)
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 67 c (1970)). For an excellent presentation of the reasons
behind congressional enactment of this statute, see 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMR.
NEws 2456-68.
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permit this beneficiary priority if he were unable to trace." Similarly,
the federal court in Elliott v. Bumb5 4 found that both bankruptcy policies
and § 67c(2), the predecessor of § 67c(1) (B), would not permit such
a claim since a state statute could not impress a trust on all assets of the
bankrupt's estate to the extent due the beneficiary."
Section 22(c) (2) of the Trust Code, by impressing a lien on all the
trustee's individual property, serves exactly the same function as the
statute in Elliott.5" This attempt to place the beneficiary in a better
position than other general creditors constitutes an illusory priority. Thus,
both bankruptcy principles and § 67c(1) (B) of the Bankruptcy Act will
deny priority to the beneficiary should he make his claim undei
§ 22 (c) (2) of the Code.
CONCLUSION
It appears that § 22 was improperly drafted. The Code is incon-
sistent in determining the availability of remedies to beneficiaries whose
converted or commingled assets can be traced since § 22(c) (1), irn
dealing with the remedies available to such beneficiaries, omits the lien
remedy. However, this remedy might be available through use of other
Code sections.
Should the beneficiary's recovery of the trust res under § 22 (c) (1)
be insufficient, the beneficiary might maintain a separate cause of action
for the breach of the trustee's duty to preserve the trust. Such a breach
constitutes a violation of § 6(b)." Thus, courts could find two separate
causes of action and permit a two-pronged recovery. Of course, the
unsecured portion of the claim must still be satisfied out of the trustee's
general assets. Still, the unsecured claim will have survived and the
beneficiary will have the same secured claim as a claimant basing recovery
on § 22(b). 8
53. 137 F. at 812. See also U.S. v. Randall, 401 U.S. 513 (1971); In re Tate-
Jones & Co., 85 F. Supp. 971 (W.D. Pa. 1949).
54. 356 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1966).
55. Id. at 755.
56. Note the similarity between the Code's "lien against the trustee's individual
property" (supra note 3) and the emphasized words in the following excerpt from
a recognized authority on bankruptcy:
If the trust fund or property cannot be identified in its original or sub-
stituted form, the cestui becomes merely a general creditor of the estate,
for the prevailing rule in trusts is that "a beneficiary who cannot find the
trust property has no lien or charge spread over the entire estate of the
faithless trustee."
4A COLLIER, supra note 39, ff 70.25 [21, at 356 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
57. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 6(b), [1971] Ind. Acts 1923; IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 31-1506(b) (Supp 1971).
58. Since the lien remedy secures the beneficiary's claim only up to the value
of the secured property, the unsecured portion is not entitled to priority.
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Without the use of this two-pronged recovery the Indiana Trust
Code places the beneficiary in a less attractive position than did pre-Code
law. Perhaps codification of a beneficiary's remedial rights should not
fall within the province of the legislature. Indeed, there is only one
other state code which provides a comprehensive remedial section. 9
Besides, courts are much better equipped to determine the proper choice
of remedies. Often, codification precludes courts from fully recompensing
a claimant. Codification also ossifies the law and eliminates the possibility
of innovative change. Indiana should, therefore, either amend the present
remedies section or, preferably, delete it from the Code.
R. CLIFFORD POTTER
59. Georgia Trust Code, 108 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 423-31 (1959).
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